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Abstract
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with
continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally
and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions.
We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a
single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with
polynomial utility functions.
1 Introduction
In finite games correlated equilibria are simpler than Nash equilibria in several senses –
mathematically at least, if not conceptually. The set of correlated equilibria is a convex
polytope, described by finitely many explicit linear inequalities, while the set of (mixed)
Nash equilibria need not be convex or connected and can contain components which look
like essentially any real algebraic variety (set described by polynomial equations on real
variables) [7]. The existence of correlated equilibria can be proven by elementary means
(linear programming or game theoretic duality [15]), whereas the existence of Nash equilibria
seems to require nonconstructive methods (e.g., fixed point theorems as in [22, 14]) or the
analysis of complicated algorithms [19, 10, 12]. Computing a sample correlated equilibrium
or a correlated equilibrium optimizing some quantity such as social welfare can be done
efficiently [13, 23]; strong evidence in complexity theory suggests that the corresponding
problems for Nash equilibria are hard [6, 4, 13].
There are several exceptional classes of games for which the above problems about Nash
equilibria become easy. The most important here are the zero-sum games. Broadly speaking,
Nash equilibria of these games have complexity similar to correlated equilibria of general
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Nash equilibria Nash equilibria correlated equilibria
(non-zero sum) (zero sum)
Finite games Semialgebraic set [20] LP LP [2]
Polynomial games Semialgebraic set [31] SDP [25] ?
Table 1: Comparison of the simplest known description of different classes of equilibrium
sets in finite and polynomial games.
games. In particular, the set of Nash equilibria is an easily described convex polytope,
existence can be proven by duality, and a sample equilibrium can be computed efficiently.
The situation in games with infinite strategy sets is not nearly so clear. For the compu-
tational sections of this paper we restrict attention to the simplest such class of games, those
with finitely many players, strategy sets equal to [−1, 1], and polynomial utility functions.
We make this restriction for several reasons.
The first is conceptual and notational simplicity. Results similar to ours will hold when
the strategy sets are general compact semialgebraic (described by finitely many polynomial
equations and inequalities) subsets of Rn. However, dealing with this additional level of
generality requires machinery from computational real algebraic geometry and does little to
illuminate our basic methods.
The second is generality. Much of the study of games with infinite strategy sets is fraught
with assumptions of concavity or quasiconcavity which appear to be motivated not by natural
game theoretic premises, but rather by the inadequacy of available tools for games without
these properties. While polynomiality assumptions and concavity assumptions are both rigid
in their own ways, polynomials have the benefit of being dense in the space of all continuous
functions, and thus suitable for approximating a much wider class of games.
The third reason is convenience. The algebraic structure we gain by restricting atten-
tion to polynomials allows us to use recent advances in semidefinite programming and real
algebraic geometry to construct efficient algorithms and gain conceptual insights.
Little is known about correlated equilibria of these polynomial games, but much is known
about Nash equilibria. Most importantly, the set of mixed Nash equilibria is nonempty
and admits a finite-dimensional description in terms of the moments of the players’ mixed
strategies [31].
This set of moments can be described explicitly in terms of polynomial equations and
inequalities [31]. The Nash equilibrium conditions are expressible via first order statements,
so the set of all moments of Nash equilibria is a real algebraic variety and can be computed
in theory, albeit not efficiently in general. In the two-player zero-sum case, the set of Nash
equilibria can be described by a semidefinite program (an SDP is a generalization of a linear
program which can be efficiently solved; see the appendix), hence we can compute a sample
Nash equilibrium or one which optimizes some linear functional in polynomial time [25]. A
summary of the results described so far is shown in Table 1.
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Contributions The impetus for this paper was to address the bottom right cell of Table
1, the one with the question mark. The table seems to suggest that the set of correlated
equilibria of a polynomial game should be describable by a semidefinite program. We will see
that this is approximately true, but not exactly. The contribution of this paper is twofold.
• First, we present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with
continuous utility functions (polynomiality is not needed here). In particular we show
that the standard definition of correlated equilibria in terms of measurable departure
functions is equivalent to other definitions in which the utilities are integrated against
all test functions in some class (Theorem 2.10). This characterization does not have
any obvious game theoretic significance, but it is extremely useful analytically and it
forms the base for our other contributions.
• Second, we present several algorithms for approximating correlated equilibria within
an arbitrary degree of accuracy. We present one inefficient linear programming based
method as a benchmark, followed by two semidefinite programming based algorithms
which perform much better in practice. The first SDP algorithm, called adaptive
discretization, iteratively computes a sequence of approximate correlated equilibria
supported on finite sets (Section 3.2). We enlarge the support sets at each iteration
using a heuristic which guarantees convergence in general and yields fast convergence
in practice. The second SDP algorithm, called moment relaxation, does not discretize
the strategy spaces but instead works in terms of joint moments. It produces a nested
sequence of outer approximations to the set of joint moments of correlated equilibrium
distributions, and these approximate equilibrium sets are described by semidefinite
programs (Section 3.3). These relaxations depend crucially on one of the correlated
equilibrium characterizations we have developed.
Related literature The questions we address and the techniques we use are inspired by
existing literature in two main areas. First, our work is related to a number of papers in the
game theory literature.
• Aumann defines correlated equilibria in his famous paper [1], focusing on finite games
to establish the basic properties and important examples. He obtains existence as a
consequence of Nash’s theorem on the existence of Nash equilibria in finite games [22].
• Hart and Schmeidler show that existence of correlated equilibria in finite games can be
proven directly by a duality argument [15]. They then use a careful limiting argument
to prove existence of correlated equilibria in continuous games with compact Hausdorff
strategy spaces (Theorem 3 of that paper). The germs of ideas in this limiting argument
are developed further in Section 2 of the present paper to yield various characterizations
of correlated equilibria. It is worth noting that in [15] the authors also consider part
(1) of Corollary 2.14 as a candidate definition of correlated equilibria. They discard it
is as not obviously capturing the game theoretic idea of correlated equilibrium, but we
prove that it is nonetheless an equivalent definition in games with continuous utilities.
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• Stoltz and Lugosi study learning algorithms which converge to correlated equilibria
in continuous games [33]. These algorithms have a game theoretic interpretation as
avoiding “regret” in a repeated game setting. Each player can carry out these proce-
dures separately without knowledge of his opponents’ utilities. These are conceptual
advantages over our methods, which merely aim for efficient computation.
However, these advantages come at a cost. The learning procedures require each player
to solve a fixed point equation at each iteration. In general finding fixed points is as
hard as finding Nash equilibria [6, 4], so these procedures do not seem to lead directly
to efficient methods for computing correlated equilibria of continuous games.
There exist classes of fixed point equations which can be solved efficiently (i.e., the
steady-state distribution of a Markov chain, which is defined by a linear program). To
our knowledge there has been no work on whether the equations of [33] fall into such
a class.
Furthermore, each of these learning algorithms either makes concavity-type assump-
tions about the utility functions, which we seek to avoid for modeling flexibility, or
discretizes the players’ strategy spaces a priori. We will see in Section 3.1 that such
discretization without regard to the structure of the game can result in slow conver-
gence.
However, we will make use of some of the tools which Stoltz and Lugosi have created.
In particular, they consider replacing the class of all measurable departure functions
with a smaller class, such as simple or continuous departure functions, and study when
this yields an equivalent equilibrium notion. One result of this type is stated as Lemma
2.11 below and used to prove our characterization theorems.
• Germano and Lugosi prove the existence of correlated equilibria with small support
in finite games [11]. To prove this they analyze the extreme points of the set of
correlated equilibria. Such an analysis cannot carry over directly to polynomial games
because the set of correlated equilibria of polynomial games may have extreme points
with arbitrarily large finite support or with infinite support [32]. Support bounds
for correlated equilibria of polynomial games are proven in [30] using similar tools,
but assuming a finitely supported Nash equilibrium is on hand as a starting point.
Since Nash equilibria are generally assumed to be harder to compute than correlated
equilibria, these results do not apply in the present setting where the goal is efficient
computation.
• Separately from the literature on correlated equilibria, Dresher, Karlin, and Shapley
study the structure of Nash equilibria in zero-sum games with polynomial or sepa-
rable (polynomial-like) utility functions. They show how to cast separable games as
finite-dimensional “convex games” by replacing the infinite-dimensional mixed strategy
spaces with finite-dimensional spaces of moments [9] and prove existence of equilibria
via fixed point arguments [8]. There always exist finitely supported equilibria in sep-
arable games as can be shown using the finite-dimensonality of the moment spaces.
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The rich geometry of these spaces is studied in [17]. Most of these results as well as ad
hoc methods for computing equilibria in simple cases are summarized in Karlin’s book
[16]. The authors of the present paper study generalizations and extensions of these
results to nonzero-sum separable games in [31].
Second, our work is related to results from the optimization and computer science liter-
ature.
• Aumann showed that the set of correlated equilibria of a finite game is defined by
polynomially many (in the size of the payoff tables) linear inequalities [2]. However, it
was not clear whether this meant they could be computed in polynomial time. This
question was settled in the affirmative when Khachian proved that linear programs
could be solved in polynomial time; for an overview of this and other more efficient
algorithms, see [3]. Papadimitriou extends this result in [23], showing that correlated
equilibria can be computed efficiently in many classes of games for which the payoffs
can be written succinctly, even if the explicit payoff tables would be exponential in
size.
• The breakthrough in optimization most directly related to the work in this paper is
the development of semidefinite programming, a far-reaching generalization of linear
programming which is still polynomial-time solvable (for an overview, see the appendix
and [35]). More specifically, the development of sum of squares methods has allowed
many optimization problems involving polynomials or moments of measures to be
solved efficiently [24]. Parrilo applies these techniques to efficiently compute Nash
equilibria of two-player zero-sum polynomial games in [25].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the classes
of games we study and correlated equilibria thereof, then prove several characterization
theorems. We present algorithms for approximating sample correlated equilibria and the set
of correlated equilibria of polynomial games in Section 3. Finally, we close with conclusions
and directions for future work.
2 Characterizations of Correlated Equilibria
In this section we will define finite and continuous games along with correlated equilibria
thereof. We will present several known characterizations of correlated equilibria in finite
games and show how these naturally extend to continuous games.
Some notational conventions used throughout are that subscripts refer to players, while
superscripts are frequently used for other indices (it will be clear from the context when they
represent exponents). If Sj are sets for j = 1, . . . , n then S = Π
n
j=1Sj and S−i = Πj 6=iSj.
The n-tuple s and the (n− 1)-tuple s−i are formed from the points sj similarly. The set of
regular Borel probability measures pi over a compact Hausdorff space S is denoted by ∆(S).
For simplicity we will write pi(s) in place of pi({s}) for the measure of a singleton {s} ⊆ S.
All polynomials will be assumed to have real coefficients.
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2.1 Finite Games
We start with the definition of a finite game.
Definition 2.1. A finite game consists of players i = 1, . . . , n, each of whom has a finite
pure strategy set Ci and a utility or payoff function ui : C → R, where C = Πnj=1Cj.
Each player’s objective is to maximize his (expected) utility. We now consider what it
would mean for the players to maximize their utility if their strategy choices were correlated.
Let R be a random variable taking values in C distributed according to some measure
pi ∈ ∆(C). A realization of R is a pure strategy profile (a choice of pure strategy for
each player) and the ith component of the realization Ri will be called the recommendation
to player i. Given such a recommendation, player i can use conditional probability to form
a posteriori beliefs about the recommendations given to the other players. A distribution
pi is defined to be a correlated equilibrium if no player can ever expect to unilaterally gain
by deviating from his recommendation, assuming the other players play according to their
recommendations.
Definition 2.2. A correlated equilibrium of a finite game is a joint probability measure
pi ∈ ∆(C) such that if R is a random variable distributed according to pi then
E [ui(ti, R−i)− ui(R)|Ri = si] ≡
∑
s−i∈C−i
Prob(R = s|Ri = si) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0
for all players i, all si ∈ Ci such that Prob(Ri = si) > 0, and all ti ∈ Ci.
While this definition captures the idea we have described above, the following character-
ization is easier to apply and visualize.
Proposition 2.3. A joint probability measure pi ∈ ∆(C) is a correlated equilibrium of a
finite game if and only if ∑
s−i∈C−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0 (1)
for all players i and all si, ti ∈ Ci.
This proposition shows that the set of correlated equilibria is defined by a finite number
of linear equations and inequalities (those in (1) along with pi(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ C and∑
s∈C pi(s) = 1) and is therefore convex and even polyhedral. It can be shown via linear
programming duality that this set is nonempty [15]. This can be shown alternatively by
appealing to the fact that Nash equilibria exist and are the same as correlated equilibria
which are product distributions.
We can think of correlated equilibria as joint distributions corresponding to recommen-
dations which will be given to the players as part of an extended game. The players are then
free to play any function of their recommendation as their strategy in the game.
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Definition 2.4. A function ζi : Ci → Ci is called a departure function.
If it is a Nash equilibrium of this extended game for each player to play his recommended
strategy (i.e. if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from using the identity
departure function), then the distribution is a correlated equilibrium. This interpretation is
due to Aumann [2] and is justified by the following alternative characterization of correlated
equilibria.
Proposition 2.5. A joint probability measure pi ∈ ∆(C) is a correlated equilibrium of a
finite game if and only if ∑
s∈C
pi(s) [ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0 (2)
for all players i and all departure functions ζi.
For examples and more discussion of the basics of correlated equilibria, including the
ideas behind the equivalence of these characterizations, see [1, 2].
2.2 Continuous Games
Again we begin with the definition of this class of games.
Definition 2.6. A continuous game consists of an arbitrary (possibly infinite) set I of
players i, each of whom has a pure strategy set Ci which is a compact Hausdorff space and
a utility function ui : C → R which is continuous.
Note that any finite set forms a compact Hausdorff space under the discrete topology
and any function out of such a set is continuous, so the class of continuous games includes
the finite games. Another class of continuous games are the polynomial games, which are
our primary focus when we study computation of correlated equilibria in the sections which
follow. The theorems and proofs below can safely be read with polynomial games in mind,
ignoring such topological subtleties as regularity of measures. However the extra generality of
arbitrary continuous games requires little additional work in the proofs of the characterization
theorems, so we will not formally restrict our attention to polynomial games here.
Definition 2.7. A polynomial game is a continuous game with n <∞ players in which the
pure strategy spaces are Ci = [−1, 1] for all players and the utility functions are polynomials.
Defining correlated equilibria in continuous games requires somewhat more care than in
finite games. Because of the technical difficulties of dealing with conditional distributions
on continuous spaces, it is preferable not to formulate our new definition by generalizing
Definition 2.2 directly. An obvious thing to try would be to replace the sum in Proposition
2.3 with an integral and to choose that as the definition of correlated equilibria in continuous
games. That would be simple enough, but this leads to a notion which is very weak and
uninformative. Since we would be integrating over “slices” our candidate definition would be
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met, for example, by any continuous probability distribution regardless of the game chosen.
Thus we have to use a different approach.
The standard definition of correlated equilibria in continuous games (as used in [15])
instead follows Proposition 2.5. In this case we must add the additional assumption that the
departure functions be Borel1 measurable to ensure that the integrals are defined. For finite
games this assumption is vacuous so this definition is equivalent to Definition 2.2.
Definition 2.8. A correlated equilibrium of a continuous game is a joint probability
measure pi ∈ ∆(C) such that∫
[ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ 0
for all i and all Borel measurable departure functions ζi.
Before stating and proving alternative characterization theorems, we will discuss some of
the difficulties of working with correlated equilibria in continuous games and this definition
in particular. The goal here is to motivate the need for alternative characterizations.
The problem of computing Nash equilibria of polynomial games can be formulated ex-
actly as a finite-dimensional nonlinear program or as a system of polynomial equations and
inequalities [31]. The key feature of the problem which makes this possible is the fact that it
has an explicit finite-dimensional formulation in terms of the moments of the players’ mixed
strategies.
To see this, suppose that player 1 chooses his action x ∈ [−1, 1] according to a mixed
strategy σ (a probability distribution over [−1, 1]). Each player’s utility function is a mul-
tivariate polynomial which only contains terms whose degree in x is at most some constant
integer d. Then regardless of how everyone chooses their strategies, their expected utility
will only depend on σ through the moments
∫
x dσ(x),
∫
x2 dσ(x), . . . ,
∫
xd dσ(x). Therefore
player 1 can switch from σ to any other mixed strategy with the same first d moments with-
out affecting game play, and we can think of the Nash equilibrium problem as one in which
each player seeks to choose moments which correspond to an actual probability distribution
and form a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand there is no exact finite-dimensional characterization of the set of
correlated equilibria in polynomial games; for a counterexample see [32]. Given the char-
acterization of Nash equilibria in terms of moments, a natural attempt would be to try to
characterize correlated equilibria in terms of the joint moments, i.e. the values
∫
sk11 · · · sknn dpi
for nonnegative integers ki and joint measures pi. In fact we will be able to obtain such a
characterization below, albeit in terms of infinitely many joint moments. The reason this
attempt fails to yield a finite dimensional formulation is that the definition of a correlated
equilibrium implicitly imposes constraints on the conditional distributions of the equilibrium
measure. A finite set of moments does not contain enough information about these condi-
tional distributions to check the required constraints exactly. Therefore we also consider
approximate correlated equilibria.
1The Borel σ-algebra is the σ-algebra generated by the topology on Ci, which was assumed given in the
definition of a continuous game.
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Definition 2.9. An -correlated equilibrium of a continuous game is a joint probability
measure pi ∈ ∆(C) such that∫
[ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ 
for all i and all Borel measurable departure functions ζi. This definition reduces to that of
a correlated equilibrium when  = 0.
That is to say, -correlated equilibria are distributions of recommendations in which
no player can improve his expected payoff by more than  by deviating from his recom-
mendation unilaterally. Compare this definition to the main characterization theorem for
-correlated equilibria below (Theorem 2.10). This theorem shows that -correlated equilib-
ria can equivalently be defined by integrating the utilities against any sufficiently rich class
of test functions, instead of by using measurable departure functions. Intuitively, the advan-
tage of this characterization is that the product fi(si)ui(ti, s−i) is a “simpler” mathematical
object than the composition ui(ζi(si), s−i), especially when fi, ti, and ζi are allowed to vary.
While this characterization does not have an obvious game theoretic interpretation, it allows
us to compute correlated equilibria both algorithmically (Section 3) and analytically [32].
There also exist a variety of characterizations in which the departure functions are re-
stricted to lie in a particular class (e.g., Lemma 2.11 below and similar results in [33]) and no
test functions are used. These characterizations have the advantages of conceptual simplic-
ity and ease of interpretation. However, any characterization involving departure functions
suffers from the difficulty that compositions of the utilities and the departure functions must
be computed and these will likely be complex even if the departure functions are restricted
to a simple class. The difficulty is magnified by the fact that even these restricted classes of
departure functions are large and often difficult to parametrize in a way which is amenable
to computation. Therefore it seems that departure function characterizations of correlated
equilibria cannot be applied directly to yield effective computational procedures.
Theorem 2.10. A probability measure pi ∈ ∆(C) is an -correlated equilibrium of a contin-
uous game if and only if for all players i, positive integers k, strategies t1i , . . . , t
k
i ∈ Ci, and
functions f 1i , . . . , f
k
i : Ci → [0, 1] in one of the classes
1. Weighted measurable characteristic functions,
2. Measurable simple functions (i.e., functions with finite range),
3. Measurable functions,
4. Continuous functions,
5. Squares of polynomials (if Ci ⊂ Rki for some ki for all i).
such that
∑k
j=1 f
j
i (si) ≤ 1 for all si ∈ Ci, the inequality
k∑
j=1
∫
f ji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi ≤  (3)
9
holds.
To prove this, we need several approximation lemmas.
Lemma 2.11 (A special case of Lemma 20 in [33]). Simple departure functions (those with
finite range) suffice to define -correlated equilibria in continuous games. That is to say, a
joint measure pi is an -correlated equilibrium if and only if∫
[ui(ξi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ 
for all players i and all Borel measurable simple departure functions ξi.
Proof. The forward direction is trivial. To prove the reverse, first fix i. Then choose any
measurable departure function ζi and let δ > 0 be arbitrary. By the continuity of ui and
compactness of the strategy spaces there exists a finite open cover U1, . . . , Uk of Ci such
that si, s
′
i ∈ U j implies |ui(si, s−i) − ui(s′i, s−i)| < δ for all s−i ∈ C−i and j = 1, . . . , k. Fix
any sji ∈ U j for all j. Define a simple measurable departure function ξi by ξi(si) = sji where
j = min{l : ζi(si) ∈ U l}. Then |ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(ξi(si), s−i)| < δ for all s ∈ C, so∫
[ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤
∫
[ui(ξi(si), s−i) + δ − ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ + δ.
Letting δ go to zero completes the proof.
Lemma 2.12. If C is a compact Hausdorff space, µ is a finite regular Borel measure on C,
f 1, . . . , fk : C → [0, 1] are measurable functions such that ∑kj=1 f j ≤ 1, and δ > 0, then there
exist continuous functions g1, . . . , gk : C → [0, 1] such that µ({x ∈ C : f j(x) 6= gj(x)}) < δ
for all j and
∑k
j=1 g
j ≤ 1.
Proof. We can apply Lusin’s theorem which states exactly this result in the case k = 1 [28].
If k > 1, then we can apply the k = 1 case with δ
k
in place of δ to each of the f j. Call
the resulting continuous functions g˜j. Then µ({x ∈ C : f j(x) 6= g˜j(x) for some j}) < δ.
But
∑k
j=1 f
j ≤ 1, so µ({x ∈ C : ∑kj=1 g˜j(x) > 1}) < δ. Let h(x) = max{1,∑kj=1 g˜j(x)} so
h : C → [1,∞) is a continuous map. Define gj(x) = g˜j(x)
h(x)
. Then the gj are continuous, sum
to at most unity, and are equal to the f j wherever all of the g˜j equal the f j, i.e. except on
a set of measure at most δ.
Lemma 2.13. If C ⊂ Rd is compact, f 1, . . . , fk : C → [0, 1] are continuous functions such
that
∑k
j=1 f
j ≤ 1, and δ > 0, then there exist polynomials p1, . . . , pk : C → [0, 1] which are
squares such that |f j(x)− pj(x)| ≤ δ for all x ∈ C and ∑kj=1 pj ≤ 1.
Proof. By the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, any continuous function on a compact subset of
Rd can be approximated by a polynomial arbitrarily well with respect to the sup norm.
Approximating the square root of a nonnegative function f using this theorem and squaring
the resulting polynomial shows that a nonnegative continuous function on a compact subset
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of Rd can be approximated arbitrarily well by a square of a polynomial with respect to the
sup norm.
Let p˜j be a square of a polynomial which approximates f j within δ
2k
in the sup norm.
Since f j takes values in [0, 1], p˜j takes values in
[
0, 1 + δ
2k
]
. Let pj = p˜
j
1+ δ
2
. Then for all
x ∈ C we have pj(x) ≤ p˜j(x) and
p˜j(x)− pj(x) = p˜j(x)− p˜
j(x)
1 + δ
2
= p˜j(x)
(
δ
2
1 + δ
2
)
≤
(
1 +
δ
2k
)( δ
2
1 + δ
2
)
≤ δ
2
,
so pj(x) is within δ
2
of p˜j(x) for all x ∈ C. By the triangle inequality pj approximates f j
within δ in the sup norm. Furthermore for all x ∈ C we have
k∑
j=1
pj(x) =
1
1 + δ
2
k∑
j=1
p˜j(x) ≤ 1
1 + δ
2
k∑
j=1
(
f j(x) +
δ
2k
)
≤ 1
1 + δ
2
(
1 +
δ
2
)
= 1.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. First we prove that if pi is an -correlated equilibrium then (3) holds
in the case where the f ji are simple. We can choose a partition B
1
i , . . . , B
l
i of Ci into disjoint
measurable sets such that f ji =
∑l
m=1 cjmχBmi where cjm ∈ [0, 1] and χBmi denotes the
indicator function which is unity on Bmi and zero elsewhere. Define a departure function
ζi : Ci → Ci piecewise on the Bmi as follows. If∫
Bmi ×C−i
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi
is nonnegative for some j define ζi(si) = t
j
i for all si ∈ Bmi where j is chosen to maximize
the above integral. If the integral is negative for all j define ζi(si) = si for all si ∈ Bmi . Then
we have
k∑
j=1
cjm
∫
Bmi ×C−i
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi ≤
∫
Bmi ×C−i
[ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] dpi
for all m. Summing over m and using the definition of an -correlated equilibrium yields (3)
in the case where the f ji are simple.
Conversely suppose that (3) holds for all measurable simple functions. Let ζi : Ci → Ci
be any simple departure function. Let t1i , . . . , t
k
i be the range of ζi and B
j
i = ζ
−1
i ({tji}).
Defining f ji = χBji
, (3) says exactly that pi satisfies the -correlated equilibrium condition for
the departure function ζi. By Lemma 2.11, pi is an -correlated equilibrium.
Any simple function can be written as a sum of weighted characteristic functions, so by
making several of the tji the same, we see that (3) for weighted characteristic functions is
the same as (3) for simple measurable functions. If the inequality (3) holds for all simple
measurable functions, a standard limiting argument proves that it holds for all measurable
f ji , hence for all continuous f
j
i .
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Suppose conversely that (3) holds for all continuous f ji . Fix any measurable f
j
i sat-
isfying the assumptions of the theorem. Define a signed measure piji on Ci by pi
j
i (Bi) =∫
Bi×C−i
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi. Let µi =
∑k
j=1|piji | and fix any δ > 0. Then by the Lemma
2.12 there exist continuous functions gji : Ci → [0, 1] which sum to at most unity and equal
the f ji except on a set of µi measure at most δ. Therefore∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
∫
f ji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi −
k∑
j=1
∫
gji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
j=1
∫
|f ji (si)− gji (si)| dpiji ≤ 2kδ,
so
k∑
j=1
∫
f ji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi ≤ + 2kδ.
But δ was arbitrary, so (3) holds for all measurable f ji .
Finally assume Ci ⊂ Rki for some ki. If (3) holds for all continuous f ji , then it holds for
all squares of polynomials. Suppose conversely that it holds for all squares of polynomials.
Let f ji be any continuous functions satisfying the assumptions of the theorem and δ > 0. Let
pji be polynomials squares which approximate the f
j
i within δ in the sup norm and satisfy
the assumptions of the theorem, as provided by Lemma 2.13. Then∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
∫
f ji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi −
k∑
j=1
∫
pji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
j=1
∫
|f ji (si)− pji (si)| dpiji ≤ δ
k∑
j=1
∫
dpiji ,
so
k∑
j=1
∫
f ji (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
dpi ≤ + δ
k∑
j=1
∫
dpiji .
But δ was arbitrary and the integrals on the right are finite, so (3) holds for all continuous
f ji .
Several simplifications occur when specializing Theorem 2.10 to the  = 0 case, yielding
the following characterization. We will use the polynomial condition of this corollary in
Section 3.3 to develop algorithms for computing (approximate) correlated equilibria. The
characteristic function condition is used to compute extreme correlated equilibria of an ex-
ample game in [32].
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Corollary 2.14. A joint measure pi is a correlated equilibrium of a continuous game if and
only if ∫
fi(si) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ 0 (4)
for all i and ti ∈ Ci as fi ranges over any of the following sets of functions from Ci to [0,∞):
1. Characteristic functions of measurable sets,
2. Measurable simple functions,
3. Bounded measurable functions,
4. Continuous functions,
5. Squares of polynomials (if Ci ⊂ Rki for some ki for all i).
Proof. When  = 0 the k = 1 case of equation (3) implies the k > 1 cases. Furthermore
 = 0 makes (3) homogeneous, so it is unaffected by positive scaling of the f ji , which allows
us to drop the assumption fi ≤ 1.
Theorem 2.10 also has important topological implications for the structure of -correlated
equilibria. Recall that the weak* topology on the set of probability distributions ∆(C) over
a compact Hausdorff space is the weakest topology which makes pi 7→ ∫ f dpi a continuous
functional whenever f : C → R is a continuous function.
Corollary 2.15. The set of -correlated equilibria of a continuous game is weak* compact.
Proof. By the continuous test function condition in Theorem 2.10, the set of -correlated
equilibria is defined by conditions of the form
∫
f dpi ≤  where f ranges over continuous
functions of the form
∑k
j=1 f
j
i (si)
[
ui(t
j
i , s−i)− ui(s)
]
. By definition this presents the set of
-correlated equilibria as the intersection of a family of weak* closed sets. Hence the set of -
correlated equilibria is a closed subset of ∆(C). But ∆(C) is compact by the Banach-Alaoglu
theorem [29], so the set of -correlated equilibria is compact.
Corollary 2.16. If pik is a sequence of k-correlated equilibria and k → 0, then the sequence
pik has a weak* limit point2 and any such limit point is a correlated equilibrium.
2It is important to note that here we use the term limit point to refer to a limit point of a sequence,
which is slightly different from a limit point of the underlying set of values which appear in the sequence.
The difference is essentially that the singleton set {pi} has no limit points (in the sense of, say, [21]), but we
would like to say that pi is a limit point of the constant sequence pi, pi, pi, . . .. Rigorously, we say that pi is a
limit point of the sequence pi1, pi2, pi3, . . . if for any neighborhood U of pi, there are infinitely many indices i
such that pii ∈ U . Equivalently (at least in a Hausdorff space) pi is a limit point of the sequence if and only
if pi appears infinitely often or pi is a limit point of the underlying set {pik|k ∈ N}.
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Proof. If there is some pi such that pik = pi for infinitely many k, then pi is a limit point of the
sequence. Also pi is an k-correlated equilibrium for arbitrarily small k, so it is a correlated
equilibrium and we are done. Otherwise, the sequence pik contains infinitely many points.
The space ∆(C) with the weak* topology is compact by the Banach-Alaoglu theorem [29],
hence any infinite set has a limit point. Let pi ∈ ∆(C) be a limit point of the sequence pik.
For any  > 0 there exists k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, pik is an -correlated equilibrium. The
set ∆(C) is Hausdorff [29], so pi is also a limit point of the set {pik}k≥k0 . Since the set of
-correlated equilibria is compact by Corollary 2.15, the limit point pi must be an -correlated
equilibrium for all  > 0, i.e. a correlated equilibrium.
Finally, we consider -correlated equilibria which are supported on some finite subset.
In this case, we obtain another generalization of Proposition 2.3 which we will use in the
algorithms presented in Section 3.2.
Proposition 2.17. A probability measure pi ∈ ∆(C˜), where C˜ = Πj∈IC˜j is a finite subset
of C, is an -correlated equilibrium of a continuous game if and only if there exist i,si such
that ∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ i,si
for all players i, all si ∈ C˜i, and all ti ∈ Ci, and∑
si∈C˜i
i,si ≤ 
for all players i.
Proof. If we replace ti with ζi(si) in the first inequality then sum over all si ∈ C˜i and combine
with the second inequality, we get that∑
s∈C˜
pi(s) [ui(ζi(si), s−i)− ui(s)] ≤  (5)
holds for all i and any function ζi : C˜i → Ci. This is exactly the definition of an -correlated
equilibrium in the case when pi is supported on the finite set C˜.
Conversely if pi satisfies (5) for all ζi : C˜i → Ci then let
i,si = max
ti∈Ci
∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] .
For each si ∈ C˜i, let ζi(si) be any ti ∈ Ci which achieves this maximum; such a ti exists
by compactness and continuity. Substituting this ζi into (5) shows that pi satisfies the
assumptions of the theorem.
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3 Computing Correlated Equilibria
We focus in this section on developing algorithms that can compute approximate correlated
equilibria with arbitrary accuracy. We consider three types of algorithms, which we will
illustrate in turn using the example below.
Example 3.1. Consider the polynomial game with two players, x and y, each choosing their
strategies from the interval Cx = Cy = [−1, 1]. Their utilities are given by
ux(x, y) = 0.596x
2 + 2.072xy − 0.394y2 + 1.360x− 1.200y + 0.554 and
uy(x, y) = −0.108x2 + 1.918xy − 1.044y2 − 1.232x+ 0.842y − 1.886.
The coefficients have been selected at random. This example is convenient, because as Figure
3 shows, the game has a unique correlated equilibrium (the players choose x = y = 1 with
probability one). For the purposes of visualization and comparison, we will project the
computed equilibria and approximations thereof into expected utility space, i.e. we will plot
pairs
(∫
ux dpi,
∫
uy dpi
)
.
3.1 Static Discretization Methods
The static discretization methods we present here are slow in practice and should be taken
as a benchmark against which to compare the methods of later sections. The techniques in
this section are general enough to apply to arbitrary continuous games with finitely many
players, so we will not restrict our attention to polynomial games here.
The basic idea of static discretization methods is to select some finite subset C˜i ⊂ Ci of
strategies for each player and limit his strategy choice to that set. Restricting the utility
functions to the product set C˜ = Πni=1C˜i produces a finite game, called a sampled game or
sampled version of the original continuous game. The simplest computational approach is
then to consider the set of correlated equilibria of this sampled game. This set is defined by
the linear inequalities in Proposition 2.3 along with the conditions that pi be a probability
measure on C˜. The complexity of this approach in practice depends on the number of points
in the discretization.
The question is then: what kind of approximation does this technique yield? In general
the correlated equilibria of the sampled game may not have any relation to the set of corre-
lated equilibria of the original game. The sampled game could, for example, be constructed
by selecting a single point from each strategy set, in which case the unique probability mea-
sure over C˜ is automatically a correlated equilibrium of the sampled game but is a correlated
equilibrium of the original game if and only if the points chosen form a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Nonetheless, it seems intuitively plausible that if a large number of points were
chosen such that any point of Ci were near a point of C˜i then the set of correlated equilibria
of the finite game would be “close to” the set of correlated equilibria of the original game in
some sense, despite the fact that each set might contain points not contained in the other.
To make this precise, we will show how to choose a discretization so that the correlated
equilibria of the finite game are -correlated equilibria of the original game.
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Proposition 3.2. Consider a continuous game with finitely many players, strategy sets Ci,
and payoffs ui. For any  > 0, there exists a finite open cover U
1
i , . . . , U
li
i of Ci such that if
C˜i ⊆ Ci is a finite set chosen to contain at least one point from each U li , then all correlated
equilibria of the finite game with strategy spaces C˜i and utilities ui|C˜ will be -correlated
equilibria of the original game.
Proof. Note that the utilities are continuous functions on a compact set, so for any  > 0
we can choose a finite open cover U1i , . . . , U
li
i such that if si varies within one of the U
l
i and
s−i ∈ C−i is held fixed, the value of ui changes by no more than . Let C˜ satisfy the stated
assumption and let pi be any correlated equilibrium of the corresponding finite game. Then
by Proposition 2.3, ∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0
for all i and all si, ti ∈ C˜i. Any ti ∈ Ci belongs to the same U li as some t˜i ∈ C˜i, so∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤
∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s)
[
ui
(
t˜i, s−i
)− ui(s) + ] ≤  ∑
s−i∈C˜−i
pi(s) = .
Therefore the assumptions of Proposition 2.17 are satisfied with i,si = 
∑
s−i∈C˜−i pi(s).
Though our primary goal here is to compute correlated equilibria, not prove existence, it is
worth noting that Proposition 3.2, Corollary 2.16, and the existence of correlated equilibria
in finite games [15] combine to prove the existence of correlated equilibria in continuous
games with finitely many players. Indeed, this is proven in [15] (along with the extension to
an arbitrary set of players) with an argument along similar lines. One can view much of the
contents of the present paper up to this point as expanding on this argument from [15].
The proof of Proposition 3.2 shows that if the utilities are Lipschitz functions, such as
polynomials, then the U li can in fact be chosen to be balls with radius proportional to . If
the strategy spaces are Ci = [−1, 1] as in a polynomial game, then C˜i can be chosen to be
uniformly spaced within [−1, 1]. In this case  = O (1
d
)
where d = maxi
∣∣∣C˜i∣∣∣.
Example 3.1 (continued). Figure 1 is a sequence of static discretizations for this game for
increasing values of d, where d is the number of points in C˜x and C˜y. These points are
selected by dividing [−1, 1] into d subintervals of equal length and letting C˜x = C˜y be the
set of midpoints of these subintervals. For this game it is possible to show that the rate of
convergence is in fact Θ
(
1
d
)
so the worst case bound on convergence rate is achieved in this
example.
In fact we can improve this convergence rate to  = O
(
1
d2
)
if we include the endpoints
±1 in C˜i as well and assume that the utilities have bounded second derivatives. We omit
the proof for brevity.
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Figure 1: Computing a sequence of -correlated equilibria of the game in Example 3.1 by
static discretization. Each point represents the (unique) correlated equilibrium of the finite
game where players are restricted to strategies chosen from a finite set of d strategies equally
spaced in [−1, 1]. The axes represent the utilities received by players x and y. It can be
shown that the convergence in this example happens at a rate  = Θ
(
1
d
)
. This is slow
enough that it is not obvious visually that the sequence of points is converging to the exact
correlated equilibrium payoff, though we can prove that it is (e.g., by combining Proposition
3.2 with Figure 3, which shows that the equilibrium payoff is unique).
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3.2 Adaptive Discretization Methods
3.2.1 A family of convergent adaptive discretization algorithms
In this section we consider continuous games with finitely many players and provide two
algorithms (the second is in fact a parametrized family of algorithms which generalizes
the first) to compute a sequence of k-correlated equilibria such that limk→∞ k = 0. By
Corollary 2.16 any limit point of this sequence is a correlated equilibrium. We will show that
for polynomial games these algorithms can be implemented efficiently using semidefinite
programming.
Informally, these algorithms work as follows. Each iteration k begins with a finite set
C˜ki ⊆ Ci of strategies which each player i is allowed to play with positive probability in that
iteration; the initial choice of this set at iteration k = 0 is arbitrary. We then compute the
“best” -correlated equilibrium in which players are restricted to use only these strategies,
i.e., the one which minimizes  (subject to some extra technical conditions needed to ensure
convergence).
Given the optimal objective value k and optimal probability distribution pik, there is some
player i who can improve his payoff by k if he switches from his recommended strategies to
certain other strategies. We interpret these other strategies as good choices for that player
to use to help make k smaller in later iterations k. Therefore we add these strategies to C˜ki
to get C˜k+1i and repeat this process for iteration k + 1.
Algorithm 3.3. Fix a continuous game with finitely many players. Let k = 0 and for each
player fix a finite subset C˜0i ⊆ Ci.
• Let pik be an k-correlated equilibrium of the game having minimal k subject to two
extra conditions. First, pik must be supported on C˜k. Second, we require that pik be
an exact correlated equilibrium of the finite game induced when deviations from the
recommended strategies are restricted to the set C˜k, i.e. when we replace the condition
ti ∈ Ci in Proposition 2.17 with ti ∈ C˜ki .
That is to say, let k be the optimal value of the following optimization problem, and
pik be an optimal assignment to the decision variables.
minimize 
subject to∑
s−i∈C˜k−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0 for all i and si, ti ∈ C˜ki∑
s−i∈C˜k−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ i,si for all i, si ∈ C˜ki and ti ∈ Ci∑
si∈C˜ki
i,si ≤  for all i
pi(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ C˜∑
s∈C˜k
pi(s) = 1
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• If k = 0, terminate.
• For each player i for whom ∑si∈C˜ki i,si = , form C˜k+1i from C˜ki by adding in, for each
si ∈ C˜ki such that i,si > 0, at least one strategy ti which makes∑
s−i∈C˜k−i
pi(s) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] = i,si .
• For all other players i, let C˜k+1i = C˜ki .
• Let k = k + 1 and repeat.
Note that all steps of this algorithm are well-defined. First, the optimization problem
is feasible. To see this let pik be any exact correlated equilibrium of the finite game with
strategy spaces C˜ki and utilities ui restricted to C˜
k; such an equilibrium exists because all
finite games have correlated equilibria [15]. The ui are bounded on C (being continuous
functions on a compact set), so by making  and the i,si large, we see that pi
k is a feasible
solution of the problem.
Second, the optimal objective value is achieved by some pik because the space of prob-
ability measures on C˜k is compact, the constraints are closed, and  is bounded below by
zero.
Third, the set of new strategies added in the third bullet is nonempty. Suppose for a
contradiction that this set were empty for each i such that
∑
si∈C˜ki i,si =  and each si ∈ C˜
k
i
such that i,si > 0. By continuity of ui and compactness of Ci, the left-hand side of the
-correlated equilibrium constraint achieves its maximum as a function of ti ∈ Ci. If this
maximum value were less than i,si , then the value of i,si could be decreased. If this could
be done for all i such that
∑
si∈C˜ki i,si =  then  itself could be decreased, contradicting
optimality of pik.
Fourth, this set of new strategies added in the third bullet consists only of strategies which
are not in C˜ki because we have the constraint that the deviations in utility be nonpositive
for ti ∈ C˜ki .
To show that Algorithm 3.3 converges, we will view it as a member of the following
family of algorithms with the parameters set to α = 0 and β = 1. Varying these parameters
corresponds to adding some slack in the exact correlated equilibrium constraints and allowing
some degree of suboptimality in the choice of strategies added to C˜ki to form C˜
k+1
i . Such
changes make little conceptual difference, but could be helpful in practice by making the
optimization problem strictly feasible and allowing it to be solved to within a known fraction
of the optimal objective value rather than all the way to optimality. We will prove that all
algorithms in this family converge, that is, with these algorithms k converges to zero in the
limit.
Algorithm 3.4. Fix a continuous game with finitely many players and parameters 0 ≤ α <
β ≤ 1. Let k = 0 and for each player fix a finite subset C˜0i ⊆ Ci.
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• Choose k to be the smallest number for which there exists pik such that:
– pik is a probability distribution supported on C˜k,
– pik is an k-correlated equilibrium of the game,
– pik is not an -correlated equilibrium for any  < k,
– pik is an αk-correlated equilibrium of the game when strategy deviations are re-
stricted to C˜k (i.e., when the condition ti ∈ Ci is changed to ti ∈ C˜ki in Proposition
2.17).
• If k = 0, terminate.
• For at least one value of i, form C˜k+1i from C˜ki by adding strategies ti,si ∈ Ci such that∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) [ui(ti,si , s−i)− ui(s)] ≥ βk.
• For all other values of i, let C˜k+1i = C˜ki .
• Let k = k + 1 and repeat.
Proposition 3.5. The steps of Algorithm 3.4 are well-defined.
Proof. It is not immediately obvious that the first step of the algorithm is well-defined, i.e.,
that a minimal k (or any k for that matter) satisfying these conditions exists. To see this let
pik,1 be an exact correlated equilibrium of the finite game induced when strategy deviations
are restricted to C˜k, and let k,1 ≥ 0 be the smallest value such that pik,1 is an k,1-correlated
equilibrium. Then the pair (pik,1, k,1) satisfies the four conditions under the first bullet
above. This shows that the set of k values satisfying these conditions is nonempty.
Choose some sequence (pik,l, k,l), l = 1, 2, . . ., of pairs satisfying these conditions such
that the limit k = liml→∞ k,l is the infimum over all k values of pairs satisfying these
conditions. Passing to a subsequence if necessary we can assume without loss of generality
that the pik,l converge to some pik. It is clear from the proof of Corollary 2.16 that pik is
an k-correlated equilibrium supported on C˜k which is an αk-correlated equilibrium when
deviations are restricted to C˜k.
From Proposition 2.17 we see that for a fixed support C˜k, the minimal value of  for which
a probability measure pi on C˜k is a correlated equilibrium of the game varies continuously
with the probabilities pi(s) for s ∈ C˜k. Therefore pik is not an -correlated equilibrium for
any  < k. Note that this final step depends crucially on the fact that C˜k is finite and
fixed while l varies. Also note that this subtlety disappears if α = 0 because in that case
it wouldn’t matter if the limiting distribution had a smaller  value. It is clear that the
remaining steps of the algorithm are well-defined.
Theorem 3.6. Fix a continuous game with finitely many players. Algorithms 3.3 and 3.4
converge to the set of correlated equilibria, i.e., they converge in the sense that k → 0.
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Proof. Suppose not, so there exists  > 0 and infinitely many values of k such that k ≥ . For
each i let B1i , . . . , B
li
i be a finite open cover of Ci such that ui(si, s−i)−ui(ti, s−i) ≤ 12(β−α)
when si and ti belong to the same set B
l
i and s−i ∈ C−i. Such a cover exists by the
compactness of the Ci and the continuity of the ui. There are finitely many sets B
l
i so there
is some iteration k, which we can take to satisfy k ≥ , such that for all i all of the sets Bli
which will ever contain an element of C˜ki at some iteration k already do.
Note that pik is an αk-correlated equilibrium when strategy choices are restricted to C˜ki ,
and k > 0 so we have βk > αk. By the minimality of k, the set C˜k+1i \ C˜ki is nonempty for
some player i (that is to say, it is always possible to perform the third step of the algorithm).
Choose such an i and ti,si ∈ C˜k+1i which satisfy∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) [ui(ti,si , s−i)− ui(s)] ≥ βk.
By assumption, for any choice of ri,si ∈ C˜ki we have∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) [ui(ri,si , s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ αk,
so ∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) [ui(ti,si , s−i)− ui(ri,si , s−i)] ≥ (β − α)k.
By construction of k, we can choose ri,si ∈ C˜ki to lie in the same set Bli as ti,si for each
si ∈ C˜ki . Thus
(β − α) ≤ (β − α)k
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) [ui(ti,si , s−i)− ui(ri,si , s−i)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s) |ui(ti,si , s−i)− ui(ri,si , s−i)|
≤
∑
s∈C˜k
pik(s)
(β − α)
2
=
(β − α)
2
,
a contradiction.
Now we will illustrate Algorithm 3.3 on two examples.
Example 3.1 (continued). In Figure 2 we illustrate Algorithm 3.3 initialized with C˜0x = C˜
0
y =
{0}. In this case convergence is obtained in three iterations, significantly faster than the
static discretization method. The resulting strategy sets were C˜2x = C˜
2
y = {0, 1}.
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Figure 2: Convergence of Algorithm 3.3 (note the change in scale from Figure 1). At each
iteration, the expected utility pair is plotted along with the computed value of  for which
that iterate is an -correlated equilibrium of the game. In this case convergence to  = 0 (to
within numerical error) occurred in three iterations.
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k k C˜kx \ C˜k−1x C˜ky \ C˜k−1y C˜kz \ C˜k−1z
0 0.99 {0} {0} {0}
1 4.16 {0.89}
2 5.76 {−1}
3 0.57 {1}
4 0.28 {0.53} {0.50, 0.63}
5 0.16 {0.49, 0.70}
6 10−7 {−1, 0.60} {−0.60, 0.47}
Table 2: Output of Algorithm 3.3 on a three player polynomial game with utilities of degree
4 and randomly chosen coefficients.
Example 3.7. For a more complex illustration, we consider a polynomial game with three
players, choosing strategies x, y, and z ∈ [−1, 1]. The utilities were chosen to be polynomials
with terms up to degree 4 in all the variables and the coefficients were chosen independently
according to a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance (their actual values are
omitted). Algorithm 3.3 proceeds as in Table 2, which shows the value of k and the new
strategies added on each iteration. The terminal probability distribution pi6 does not display
any obvious structure; in particular it is not a Nash equilibrium (product distribution).
3.2.2 Implementing these algorithms with semidefinite programs
To implement these algorithms for polynomial games, we must be able to do two things.
First, we need to solve optimization problems with finitely many decision variables, linear
objective functions and two types of constraints: nonnegativity constraints on linear func-
tionals of the decision variables, and nonnegativity constraints on univariate polynomials
whose coefficients are linear functionals of the decision variables. That is to say, we must be
able to handle constraints of the form p(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [−1, 1], where the coefficients of
the polynomial p are linear in the decision variables. Second, we need to extract values of t
for which such polynomial inequalities are tight at the optimum.
Both of these tasks can be done simultaneously by casting the problem as a semidefinite
program (SDP). For an overview of semidefinite programs and a summary of the necessary
results (both of which are classical), see the appendix.
In the optimization problem in Algorithm 3.3 we have a finite number of univariate
polynomials in ti whose coefficients are linear in the decision variables pi(s) and i,si . We
wish to constrain these coefficients to allow only polynomials which are nonnegative for all
ti ∈ [−1, 1]. By Propositions A.3 and A.4 in the appendix this is the same as asking that
these coefficients equal certain linear functions of matrices (i.e., sums along antidiagonals)
which are constrained to be symmetric and positive semidefinite. Therefore we can write
this optimization problem as a semidefinite program.
As a special case of convex programs, semidefinite programs have a rich duality theory
which is useful for theoretical and computational purposes. In particular, SDP solvers keep
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a b c
a 0 1 0
b 1 5 7
c 0 7 0
Table 3: A finite symmetric game with identical utilities for which Algorithm 3.4 with
α = β = 1 does not converge when started with strategy sets C˜01 = C˜
0
2 = {a}.
track of feasible primal and dual solutions in order to determine when optimality is reached.
It can be shown that the dual data obtained by an SDP solver run on this optimization
problem will encode the values of ti making the polynomial inequalities tight at the optimum
[24].
The process of generating an SDP from the optimization problem in the algorithms above,
solving it, and extracting an optimal solution along with ti values from the dual can all be
automated. We have done so using the SOSTOOLS MATLAB toolbox for the pre- and
post-processing and SeDuMi for solving the semidefinite programs efficiently [26, 34].
3.2.3 A nonconvergent limiting case
Note that in the algorithms above the convergence of the sequence k is not necessarily
monotone. If we were to let α = β (a case we did not allow above), the sequence would
become monotone nonincreasing. If we were to furthermore fix α = β = 1, then the condition
that pi be an exact (or αk-) correlated equilibrium when deviations are restricted to C˜ki would
become redundant and could be removed.
These changes would simplify the behavior of Algorithm 3.4 conceptually as well as
reducing the size of the SDP solved at each iteration, so we would like to adopt them if
possible. However, the resulting algorithm may not converge, in the sense that k may
remain bounded away from zero.
Example 3.8. Consider the game shown in Table 3, which is symmetric and has identical
utilities for both players. Let C˜01 = C˜
0
2 = {a} and apply Algorithm 3.3, but remove the
condition that pik be an exact correlated equilibrium when deviations are restricted to C˜ki .
The only probability distribution supported on C˜0 is δ(a,a) which has an objective value of
0 = 1. It is easy to see that C˜1i is formed by simply adding each player’s best response to
a, so that C˜11 = C˜
1
2 = {a, b}. We will argue that the unique solution to the optimization
problem in iteration k = 1 is also δ(a,a), hence C˜
2
i = C˜
1
i and the algorithm gets “stuck”, so
that k = 0 = 1 for all k.
For a probability distribution pi, let piT denote pi with the players interchanged. By
symmetry and convexity, if pi is an optimal solution then so is pi+pi
T
2
, which is a symmetric
probability distribution with respect to the two players. Hence an optimal solution which
is symmetric always exists. We will parametrize such distributions by pi = pδ(a,a) + qδ(a,b) +
qδ(b,a) + rδ(b,b), where p, q, r ≥ 0 and p+ 2q+ r = 1. Define a departure function ζ : C1 → C1
by ζ(a) = b, ζ(b) = ζ(c) = c. Then for pi to be an -correlated equilibrium it must satisfy
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k k C˜kx \ C˜k−1x C˜ky \ C˜k−1y
0 2 {−1} {−1}
1 4 {0} {0}
2 0 {1} {1}
Table 4: Output of Algorithm 3.3 for a polynomial game on which Algorithm 3.4 with
α = β = 1 does not converge to a correlated equilibrium.
the following condition:
 ≥
∑
s1∈C˜11
1,s1 ≥
∑
s∈C˜1
pi(s) [u1(ζ(s1), s2)− u1(s1, s2)]
= p+ 4q − q + 2r = 1 + q + r.
We know we can achieve  = 1 with p = 1 (i.e. pi = pi0 = δ(a,a)), and this inequality
shows that if p < 1 then  > 1. Therefore the minimal  value in iteration k = 1 is
unity and is achieved by pi = δ(a,a). Furthermore we have shown that this is the unique
symmetric probability distribution which achieves the minimal value of . Hence any other
(not necessarily symmetric) optimal solution pˆi satisfies pˆi+pˆi
T
2
= δ(a,a). But δ(a,a) is an extreme
point of the convex set of probability distributions on C˜1, so we must in fact have pˆi = δ(a,a).
Therefore pi1 = pi0 = δ(a,a) is the unique optimal solution on iteration k = 1, so the procedure
must get stuck as claimed. That is, C˜ki = {a, b} and k = 1 for all k ≥ 1.
The same behavior can occur in polynomial games, as can be shown by “embedding” the
above finite game in a polynomial game. For example, we can take Cx = Cy = [−1, 1] and
ux(x, y) = uy(x, y) = (1− x2)(3y2 + 6y + 5)
+ (1− y2)(3x2 + 6x+ 5).
Then if C˜0x = C˜
0
y = {−1} the same analysis as above shows that C˜kx = C˜ky = {−1, 0} and
k = 2 for all k ≥ 1.
Example 3.9. If we run Algorithm 3.3 on this polynomial game, the iterations proceed as in
Table 4. The correlated equilibrium obtained in iteration 2 is
pi2 = 0.4922δ(x = 0, y = 1) + 0.4922δ(x = 1, y = 0)
+ 0.0156δ(x = 1, y = 1),
i.e., a probability of 0.4922 is assigned to each of the outcomes (x, y) = (0, 1) and (x, y) =
(1, 0) and a probability of 0.0156 is assigned to (x, y) = (1, 1).
3.3 Moment Relaxation Methods
In this section we again consider only polynomial games. The moment relaxation meth-
ods for computing correlated equilibria have a different flavor from the discretization meth-
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ods discussed above. Instead of using tractable finite approximations of the correlated equi-
librium problem derived via discretizations, we begin with the alternative exact characteri-
zation given in condition 5 of Corollary 2.14. In particular, a measure pi on C is a correlated
equilibrium if and only if ∫
p2(si) [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s) ≤ 0 (6)
for all i, ti ∈ Ci, and polynomials p. If we wish to check all these conditions for polynomials
p of degree less than or equal to d, we can form the matrices
Sdi =

1 si s
2
i · · · sdi
si s
2
i s
3
i · · · sd+1i
s2i s
3
i s
4
i · · · sd+2i
...
...
...
. . .
...
sdi s
d+1
i s
d+2
i · · · s2di
 .
Let c be a column vector of length d + 1 whose entries are the coefficients of p, so p2(si) =
c′Sdi c. If we define
Mdi (ti) =
∫
Sdi [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] dpi(s),
then (6) is satisfied for all p of degree at most d if and only if c′Mdi (ti)c ≤ 0 for all c ∈ Rd+1
and ti ∈ Ci, i.e. if and only if Mdi (ti) is negative semidefinite for all ti ∈ Ci.
The matrix Mdi (ti) has entries which are polynomials in ti with coefficients which are
linear in the joint moments of pi. By Proposition A.5 in the appendix, Mdi (ti) is negative
semidefinite for all ti ∈ [−1, 1] for a given d and a fixed pi if and only if there exists a
certificate of a certain form proving this condition holds. We can write a semidefinite program
(again, see Proposition A.5 in the appendix) in which the decision variables represent such a
certificate, so we can check this condition by solving the semidefinite program. As d increases
we obtain a sequence of semidefinite relaxations of the correlated equilibrium problem and
these converge to the exact condition for a correlated equilibrium. That is to say, for a
measure to be a correlated equilibrium it is necessary and sufficient that its moments be
feasible for all of these semidefinite programs.
We can also let the measure pi vary by replacing the moments of pi with variables and
constraining these variables to satisfy some necessary conditions for the moments of a joint
measure on C (see appendix). These conditions can be expressed in terms of semidefinite
constraints and there is a sequence of these conditions which converges to a description
of the exact set of moments of a joint measure pi. Thus we obtain a nested sequence of
semidefinite relaxations of the set of moments of measures which are correlated equilibria,
and this sequence converges to the set of correlated equilibria.
Example 3.1 (continued). Figure 3 shows moment relaxations of orders d = 0, 1, and 2. Since
moment relaxations are outer approximations to the set of correlated equilibria (having been
defined by necessary conditions which correlated equilibria must satisfy) and the 2nd order
26
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
−2.6
−2.4
−2.2
−2
−1.8
−1.6
−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
u
x
u
y
Moment Relaxation Correlated Equilibrium Payoffs of Order d = 0, 1, and 2
0th order
1st order
2nd order
(unique payoffs)
Figure 3: Semidefinite relaxations approximating the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.
The second order relaxation is a singleton, so this game has a unique correlated equilibrium
payoff (and in fact a unique correlated equilibrium).
moment relaxation corresponds to a unique point in expected utility space, all correlated
equilibria of the example game have exactly this expected utility. In fact, the set of points in
this relaxation is a singleton (even before being projected into utility space), so this proves
that this example game has a unique correlated equilibrium.
4 Future Work
These results leave several open questions. For any continuous game, the set of correlated
equilibria is nonempty, and this can be proven constructively as in [15]. Under the same as-
sumptions we can prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, but the proof is nonconstructive,
or at least does not seem to give an efficient algorithm for constructing an equilibrium [31]. In
the case of polynomial games, existence of a Nash equilibrium immediately gives existence of
a finitely supported Nash equilibrium by Carathe´odory’s theorem, which is constructive [31].
Therefore there exists a finitely supported correlated equilibrium of any polynomial game. Is
there a constructive way to prove this fact directly, without going through Nash equilibria?
Such a proof could potentially lead to a provably efficient algorithm for computing a sample
correlated equilibrium of a polynomial game.
While the adaptive discretization and moment relaxation algorithms converge in general
and work well in practice, we do not know of any results regarding rate of convergence. If
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we regard the probability distributions produced by these algorithms at the kth iteration as
k-correlated equilibria, how fast does k converge to zero?
Finally, we note that we have merely shown that the adaptive discretization algorithm
converges to the set of correlated equilibria, not to a particular correlated equilibrium (of
course it will do so along some subsequence by compactness). Could the algorithm be
modified to converge to a single correlated equilbrium? Or even better, could one assure
convergence to a correlated equilibrium with some desirable properties, such as one which
maximizes the social welfare or (in the polynomial case) is finitely supported? This seems
plausible given that the algorithm is itself optimization-based, but these problems remain
open.
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A Semidefinite programming, sums of squares, and
moments of measures
Definition A.1. A semidefinite program is an optimization problem of the form:
minimize L(S)
subject to T (S) = v
S is a symmetric matrix
S  0 (positive semidefinite),
where L is a given linear functional, T is a given linear transformation, v is a given vector,
and S is a square matrix of decision variables.
Semidefinite programs are convex optimization problems and generalize linear programs
(T and v can be designed to make S diagonal, in which case the condition S  0 is the same
as the condition that S ≥ 0 elementwise). The solution set of a semidefinite program need
not be polyhedral, allowing for much more flexibility in modeling than can be achieved with
linear programs. Many problems can be expressed exactly or approximately as semidefinite
programs, and this is important because semidefinite programs can be solved efficiently by
interior point methods. For details and a variety of examples see [35] and [24].
The square of a real-valued function is nonnegative on its entire domain, as is a sum of
squares of real-valued functions. In particular, any polynomial of the form p(x) =
∑
p2k(x),
where pk are polynomials, is guaranteed to be nonnegative for all x. This gives a sufficient
condition for a polynomial to be nonnegative. It is a classical result that this condition is
also necessary if p is univariate [27].
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Proposition A.2. A univariate polynomial p is nonnegative on R if and only if it is a sum
of squares.
Proof. A simpler version of the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition A.3 (Markov-Luka´cs [18]). A univariate polynomial p(x) is nonnegative on
the interval [−1, 1] if and only if p(x) = s(x) + (1− x2)t(x) where s and t are both sums of
squares of polynomials.
Proof. Direct algebraic manipulations show that the set of polynomials of the form s(x)+(1−
x2)t(x) where s and t are sums of squares of polynomials in x is closed under multiplication
and contains all polynomials of the following forms: a for a ≥ 0, (x − a)2 + b2 for a, b ∈ R,
x− a for a ≤ −1, and a− x for a ≥ 1. By assumption p(x) factors as a product of terms of
these types, because any real root of p in the interval (−1, 1) must have even multiplicity.
These sum of squares conditions are easy to express using linear equations and semidefi-
nite constraints.
Proposition A.4. A univariate polynomial p(x) =
∑2d
k=0 pkx
k of degree at most 2d is a sum
of squares of polynomials if and only if there exists a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix
Q ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1) such that pk =
∑
i+j=kQij (numbering the rows and columns of Q from 0
to d).
Proof. Relating the coefficients of p(x) to the entries of Q in this way is the same as writing
p(x) = xTQx where x =
[
1 x x2 · · · xd]T . Thought of in this way, saying that p(x) is
a sum of squares is the same as saying that Q =
∑
i qiq
T
i for some column vectors qi and
in this case Q is clearly positive semidefinite. Conversely, if Q is positive semidefinite then
there exists a matrix F such that Q = F TF , so p(x) = xTQx =
∑
i [Fx]
2
i .
Similar semidefinite characterizations exist for multivariate polynomials to be sums of
squares. While the condition of being a sum of squares does not characterize general non-
negative multivariate polynomials exactly, there exist sequences of sum of squares relaxations
which can approximate the set of nonnegative polynomials (on e.g. Rk, [−1, 1]k, or a more
general semialgebraic set) arbitrarily tightly [27]. Furthermore, for some special classes of
multivariate polynomials, the sum of squares condition is exact.
Proposition A.5. A matrix M(t) whose entries are univariate polynomials in t is positive
semidefinite on [−1, 1] if and only if x′M(t)x = S(x, t) + (1− t2)T (x, t) where S and T are
polynomials which are sums of squares.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5.6 of [5].
Now suppose we wish to answer the question of whether a finite sequence (µ0, . . . , µk) of
reals correspond to the moments of a measure on [−1, 1], i.e. whether there exists a positive
measure µ on [−1, 1] such that µi = ∫ xi dµ(x). Clearly if such a measure exists then we
must have
∫
p(x) dµ(x) ≥ 0 for any polynomial p of degree at most k which is nonnegative
on [−1, 1]. This necessary condition for moments to correspond to a measure turns out to
be sufficient [17] and can be written in terms of semidefinite constraints.
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Proposition A.6. The condition that a finite sequence of numbers (µ0, . . . , µk) be the mo-
ments of a positive measure on [−1, 1] can be written in terms of linear equations and semidef-
inite matrix constraints.
One can formulate similar questions about whether a finite sequence of numbers cor-
responds to the joint moments
∫
xi11 · · ·xikk dµ(x) of a positive measure µ on [−1, 1]k (or a
more general semialgebraic set). Using a sequence of semidefinite relaxations of the set of
nonnegative polynomials on [−1, 1]k, a sequence of necessary conditions for joint moments
is obtained. These conditions approximate the set of joint moments arbitrarily closely.
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